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Abstract 
 
Can differences in institutional quality explain current account imbalances in the Euro area? 
This paper emphasizes a link between current accounts and institutional quality based on a 
country study for Greece. Subsequently it tests the relationship for a homogeneous sample of 
24 European countries over the period 1990 through 2013. Regression analysis indicates that 
institutional quality is crucial to understand the evolution of the current accounts. The 
relationship holds for both the Euro area and the EU, however it is starker for the former. In 
addition, we find that with the introduction of the euro the influence of institutional quality 
became stronger. Furthermore, our results hold for the intra-EU and total trade balances but not 
for the external trade balances. Finally, the findings support the argument for structural reforms 
and more efficient governance in order to avoid future imbalances of the same magnitude. 
Supranational institutions such as the ESM, closer scrutiny of national regulators and 
governments as well as the strengthening of the regulatory mandate of the ECB likely contribute 
to a more stable currency area.               
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1. Introduction  
Current account imbalances in the years before the financial crisis of 2008 have been identified 
as an amplifier for the severity of the crisis in several Euro area countries. In addition, structural 
reforms as part of adjustment programs have recently raised considerable interest. For instance, 
public administration reforms, a more efficient tax collection system as well as anti-corruption 
measures were frequently highlighted in the wake of the latest bailout program for Greece. In 
a similar fashion, structural reforms have also been part of the adjustment programs for Portugal 
and Cyprus. 
While there is no economic reason to assume that current accounts in highly integrated areas 
such as the EU should be balanced, the severity and the persistence of the imbalances before 
2008 had been unsustainable. The current account literature, explains this with the presence of 
market rigidities and distortions. For example, fixed exchange rates may prevent the adjustment 
of real exchange rates. This however results either in a gain or loss in competitiveness and thus 
current account imbalances. Similarly, bad macroprudential policies may result in an 
exaggeration of exogenous shocks instead of adjustment. Two examples for such policies are 
the inflated government budgets in Greece and the weakly regulated distribution of housing 
credit in Spain in the years before the financial crisis.  
The motivation behind this paper, is to test the hypothesis that heterogeneity in institutional 
quality across countries can explain the dispersion of the current account within the EU. 
Specifically, the pattern across the Euro area is investigated. Two potential problems arise from 
the nature of institutions. First, political institutions cannot be measured directly; institutional 
quality in the sense of this paper therefore refers to outcome measures. Government 
effectiveness and corruption constitute amongst others such measures. Second, institutional 
quality typically is higher, the more developed a state is. According to Glaeser et al. (2004) the 
causality could however go into both directions. For the current account the direction of 
causality however should be one way. There is no reason to assume that current account deficits 
cause weak institutions.  
Previewing the main results, this paper finds that differences in institutional quality contributed 
to the widening of current account dispersion in the EU over the period 1990 to 2008. In 
addition, the results show that the effect is starker for the Euro area. Moreover, the adoption of 
the Euro had a significant impact on the relationship between current accounts and institutional 
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quality. Finally, we establish that our findings hold for the intra-EU trade balance as well as for 
the total trade balance likewise.      
The results of this paper show that to a first order, the results of this study back the narrative 
that institutional quality matters with respect to the current account. Overall, this entails two 
important messages for policy makers. Without further improvements in institutional quality, 
in the crisis countries, the mistakes of the past are likely to be repeated. Not now, but as soon 
as the economic conditions become brighter. The positive message is that EU policy makers 
can support national authorities with expertise. As a result efficient and appropriate institutions 
that reflect the best characteristics of each nation’s administrative practices could be developed.                       
This paper is structured as follows. The next section focuses on the case of Greece and points 
out a country specific narrative for the ongoing crisis in line with the rest of this paper. Section 
3 provides an overview over the related literature. Data and Methodology are described in 
Section 4. Subsequently section 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. The last section 
summarizes the findings. In addition, directions for further research as well as policy advices 
are given.    
2. Greece as an Example for Institutional Weaknesses 
After six years of deep recession, during which Greek GDP contracted by more than 25 percent, 
the economy showed for the first time an expansion of 0.8 percent in 20141. Nevertheless, the 
economic situation in Greece seven years after the crisis continues to be bleak. On a purchasing 
power basis, Greece’s per capita GDP which had risen to 86.1% (77%) by 2008 fell to 67% 
(58%) of Euro area (German) levels by 20142.  With one quarter of the workforce still 
unemployed and youth unemployment persistently close to 50 percent the labour market 
remains in distress3. Moreover, government debt peaked around 177.1 percent of GDP by the 
end of 2014. Additionally, capital controls which have been introduced to avoid a collapse of 
the banking sector will remain until 2016, according to the Bank of Greece. More notably, 
Greece reports a small current account surplus in the first two quarters of 2015. This however 
was the result of an outflow of capital and a sharp decline in imports, accompanied by only a 
modest increase in exports according to the Bank of Greece.  
 
                                                 
1 GDP Annual Growth Rate in Greece is reported by the National Statistical Service of Greece. 
2 Source: Eurostat (GDP per capita in PPS EU15=100) 
3 Source: Eurostat, numbers are for June 2015 
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As argued in Beck (2015), a significant difference between Greece and the rest of the Eurozone 
exists, with regard to institutional indicators. Figure 1 shows the rank of EU countries in the 
category effectiveness of the government. Additionally, the upper and lower significance bands 
(90%) are reported. Greece has the lowest rank compared to the rest of the Euro area. More 
notably, with exception to Italy its significance band does not overlap with the Euro area 
countries that virtually adopted the Euro in 19994.     
 
Figure 1 Effectiveness of Government  
Source: World Governance Indicators Database 
 
Similarly, the numbers in Table 1 support the argument of Greece as an outlier with regard to 
institutional quality. Table 1a is based on the latest Sustainable Governance Indicators 
(SGI2015) for 41 OECD and EU countries. The SGI are divided into three main categories. The 
first category is Policy Performance which consists of economic policies, social policies and 
environmental policies. Quality of Democracy constitutes the second category. Lastly, 
measures of Governance form category three. In comparison with other indicators such as the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, the SGI provide more in depth measures and considerably 
more categories. 
 
                                                 
4 Greece adopted the Euro in 2001 and participated in the public roll-out of the coins. In 1999, however it failed 
to meet the criteria.   
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Table 1a illustrates that Greece’s performance compared to other Euro area countries is weak. 
Its overall score in Policy Performance ranks it last, behind Cyprus (40) and Bulgaria (36), 
which are geographically close. The differences are extremely pronounced, in comparison to 
Sweden and Germany, however less stark for Portugal. In Policy Performance Greece index 
value is only 56% of the Swedish and 61% of the German level. The same difference is evident 
for Governance, where Greece ranks 36, with an index score of 60% relative to Sweden and 
69% to Germany. 
Table 1 Sustainable Governance Indicators and Doing Business ranking 
 Greece Sweden Germany Portugal 
a. SGI 
 rank index rank index rank index rank index 
Policy 
Performance 
41 4.40 1 7.83 6 7.19 29 5.30 
Quality of 
Democracy 
29 6.90 2 9.25 5 8.70 21 7.38 
Governance 
 
36 5.02 1 8.42 8 7.25 33 5.54 
b. Doing Business 
 DB15 DB14 DB15 DB14 DB15 DB14 DB15 DB14 
Total Rank 61 65 11 12 14 13 25 23 
Paying Taxes 59 41 35 38 68 64 64 56 
Registering 
Propery 
116 170 18 21 89 80 25 25 
Resolving 
Insolvency 
52 51 17 18 3 3 10 11 
Enforcing 
Contracs 
155 155 21 21 13 13 27 27 
Construction 
Permits 
88 90 18 17 8 7 58 58 
Getting 
Electricity 
80 73 7 6 3 2 47 43 
Note: Rank indicates country rank among a sample of 41 (a) / 189 (b) countries. Index values range between 0 
and 10. Source: Bertelsmann Foundation, SGI 2015, Doing Business 2014&2015 
 
Table 1b shows that Greece significantly improved its World Bank rating in terms of ease of 
doing business (Doing Business 2015).  Though, its 61st place in the ranking is still one place 
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behind Tunisia, and far behind Sweden (11), Germany (14) and Portugal (25). On individual 
measures Greece’s performance is also poor. In enforcing contracts, a key characteristic of 
advanced economies it ranks 155, one behind Malawi and 128 ranks behind Portugal. On 
construction permits, one rank behind Peru; on registering property, behind Morocco and one 
resolving insolvency Greece neighbours China. Nonetheless, on paying taxes, where high tax 
rates and complicated procedure hamper a business friendly environment, Greece is in the range 
of Sweden, Germany and Portugal. In fact, its tax legislation is more business friendly than in 
Germany5.   
Nevertheless, the numbers reported in Table 1, show that Greece is still a developing country 
in many ways (Bulow and Rogoff, 2015). Nonetheless, it has made significant improvements 
in certain areas due to reforms in the recent past. Nevertheless some reforms by now simply 
exist on paper or require more time to impact (Beck, 2015). Despite its efforts, the conclusion 
from this exercise is that Greece still performs poorly in governance and policy measures. 
Furthermore this section concludes that Greece does not have a business environment as 
friendly as other Euro area or non-Euro EU countries. 
One possible explanation for the prevalence of corruption and inefficient government 
procedures in Greece can be found in the country’s history6. A proud nation with a rich cultural 
heritage, Greece, however suffered under foreign occupation for several hundred years. From 
the mid-15th century until its war of independence, Greece had been under Ottoman rule. This 
had a lasting impact on its business practices, its social norms as well as on its political culture 
(Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2009). The new elite, that held posts in the Ottoman administration 
became an oligarchy and gained a negative reputation for corruption and nepotism (Koliopoulos 
and Veremis, 2009).  
In 1832 the republic of Greece was established after France, Britain and Russia helped the 
Greek national movement to overthrow the occupants. Britain, Russia and France implemented 
King Otto of Bavaria, as ruler in 1833. Otto’s German regents tried to implement institutions 
based on German-style rigid hierarchical structures, which turned out to be unpopular. 
Throughout the 19th century, clientelism and reoccurring electoral upheavals characterized 
 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately Doing Business rank values are not available for earlier years. However, on individual measures 
the improvements Greece has made compared to 2008 are substantial. One example is the significant reduction 
in the time it takes to import goods. Bourdet and Persson (2012) provide a more detailed discussion on the doing 
business database.   
6Koliopoulos, John S., and Thanos M. Veremis. Modern Greece: A History since 1821 (2009)  
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Greek politics. In 1983 after 1826 Greece had to declare insolvency for the second time in 
modern history. The cause had been corruption and excessive spending. In total, Greece 
defaulted 6 times between 1826 and 1964 on its debt (Reinhardt and Rogoff, 2011). 
Furthermore Reinhardt and Rogoff (2011) emphasize that Greece had been in external default 
for almost 50 years during that period.  
Despite the fact, that Greece is commonly known as the “cradle of democracy”, the democratic 
Greece of today evolved only in 1974. Before 1974 a military junta ruled Greece. This junta 
had previously overthrown the monarchy and parliamentary rule in a coup d’état in 1967. The 
dictatorship came to an end in 1974 when senior military officers withdrew their support after 
the failed coup d’état in Cyprus, which had been sponsored by the Greek junta. A new civil 
government of national unity replaced the military government. However, the old civil servants 
remained in power (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2009). Parliamentary democracy was re-
established and elections were held for the first time since the coup. Yet, monarchy was finally 
abolished and Greece became a republic by the end of 1974. 
In 1981, Greece became a member of the European Community7. The reason for its membership 
back then was its geopolitical position as a member of NATO (Kalatzidis, 2010). As argued by 
Eleftheriadis (2014) this step strengthened traditional Greek hierarchies and increased the 
influence of oligarchs. At the same time it weakened the position of the state. Greek oligarchs 
nowadays control over 90 percent of the media, and dominate almost all key industries that 
depend heavily on government patronage (Eleftheriadis, 2014). In 2004 hosted the Olympic 
Games. With more than 9 billion Euros in total costs, hosting the event became a burden to the 
Greek taxpayers. In that sense, Malkoutzis (2012) argues, that the Olympics revealed the 
structural problems that existed for decades and foreshadowed prospective vulnerability. 
Nonetheless, important interest groups such as unions for certain professions block attempts to 
reform the country (Kalatzidis, 2010). According to Eleftheriadis (2014) opposition from the 
media has been the biggest barrier to such reforms, in the 1990s but also in the aftermath of the 
crisis.  
When Greece adopted the Euro in 2001, its official debt statistics were subject to fraud, a 
problem of which the European institutions had been unaware until 2004 (European 
Commission, 2010). In addition, the general government deficit figures were revised for various 
 
                                                 
7 A detailed discussion focussing on post-dictatorial Greece and the institutional weaknesses such as extralegal 
corruption in Greece politics can be found in Kalatzidis(2010).   
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years (2007, 2008 and 2009) and resembled a “pack of lies” (Giavazzi and Spaventa, p. 2, 
2010).  Furthermore, in 2010 obligatory reporting requirements on financial derivatives were 
not respected by the Greek authorities. These two incidences ignited the 2009/2010 crisis in 
Greece. The root of the crisis however lies deeper. 
As argued by Lane (2010), the elimination of currency risks and the deeper financial integration 
had substantial impacts. Even low yield differentials had the potential to attract massive capital 
flows. Therefore, the formation of the Euro area represented a major shock for countries such 
as Greece and Portugal. To analyse this issue in more detail, Figure 2 plots the evolution of 
long term government bond yields in percent, from 1993 onwards8.  
 
Figure 2 Evolution of Long Term Government Bond Yields  
Source: Eurostat 
For Greece, the decline is especially stark. In 1993, Greece had to pay as much as 24.6% for 
bonds with a 10 year residual maturity. By 2001, however the difference in bond yields had 
narrowed to 26 basis points compared to German bonds. This development is linked to the 
criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. In order to adopt the euro, Greece had to discipline its finances 
 
                                                 
8 Long term government bond yields are calculated as monthly averages. They refer to central government bond 
yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with a residual maturity of around 10 years. The bond or the bonds 
of the basket have to be replaced regularly to avoid any maturity drift. This definition is used in the convergence 
criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union for long-term interest rates, as required under Article 121 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the Protocol on the convergence criteria. 
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in the early and mid-1990s. Though, when it became public that public debt data had been 
revised, bond yields increased sharply and peaked close to 30% in February 2012.        
The sudden availability of external finance resulted in two developments. On one hand, rising 
current account as well as trade deficits. On the other, less budget discipline. The left graph in 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the current account and trade balance. The right graph plots the 
net foreign asset position. Four observations stand out. First, Greece never managed to run a 
trade surplus as indicated by the dashed line. Moreover its trade deficit in 2013 was still greater 
than 10% of GDP.  
 
Figure 3 Current Account, Trade Balance and Net Foreign Assets in Greece 
Source: AMECO and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s External Wealth of Nations MarkII Database 2007 
 
Second, its current account position improved in the early 1990s but worsened in the wake of 
the Euro. Overall, current account to GDP averaged -5.03 percent from 1980 until 2014. It 
reached an all-time high of 0.90 percent in 2014 and a record low of -14.90 percent in 2008. 
Third the persistency of its current account deficit led to deterioration in the net foreign assets 
position. In 2008 the NFA exceeded 100 percent of GDP and became clearly unsustainable. 
Similar levels usually indicate the potential of a balance of payment crisis as shown by Catao 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2013). Fourth, after 2009 a sharp reversal in its current account took place. 
This happened in the presence of a sudden stop and the incapability of the Greek government 
to finance its deficit on the bond market.  
14 
 
  
During 2003 and 2008 the Greek government persistently violated the criteria of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Table 2 displays the change in general government balance as well as general 
government debt to GDP for Greece and 3 additional benchmarks. With gross debt above 100 
percent and an average budget deficit of more than 6 percent, the 60 percent debt and 3 percent 
deficit criteria was clearly not met throughout the whole period. In 2008, but more drastically 
in 2009, the general government deficit worsened substantially. In 2009 it peaked with a deficit 
of almost 14 percent of GDP. Similarly, the budget deficits increased in Portugal as well as in 
Spain. However, both countries had close to average or below average debt levels.    
Table 2 General Government Balance and Consolidated Gross Debt (%) of GDP 
 General Government Balance Debt 
 Average 
2000-07 
2008 2009 2000 2008 2009 
Euro Area -2.3 -2.0 - 6.3 - 69.5  79.2 
Greece  -6.1 -7.7 -13.6 99.5e 109.3 126.8 
Portugal  -4.1 -3.7 - 7.1 50.3 71.1  83.6 
Spain  -1.3 -4.1 -11.2 58 39.4  52.7 
Source:  General Government Consolidated Gross Debt AMECO. Estimated (e) Gross Debt for Greece in 2000 
taken from IMF’s WEO. General Government Balance taken from  Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010).  
 
3. Related Literature 
Previous research on current account imbalances has been an important area of research during 
the last decades. Nevertheless, the majority of papers focus on emerging economies. The 
financial crisis of 2008, however, has triggered new research based on the determinants of 
current account deficits in the European Union. Nevertheless, the direct link between the current 
account balances and institutional heterogeneity across the EU has not been the direct subject 
of any previous study9. Therefore this study aims to fill that gap. By doing so, this paper 
provides another view on intra- Eurozone imbalances. The argument is that downhill flows of 
capital resulting in current account deficits are not solely driven by fundamentals and higher 
expected growth rates. Instead, this paper emphasizes the importance of institutional quality or 
its absence to explain current account behaviour.  
This paper builds on previous work from recent literature. Closest to this study is a paper written 
by Berger and Nitsch (2010). The authors examine the persistence of intra-euro imbalances 
 
                                                 
9 However papers such as Eichengreen (2010) and Beck (2015) mention corruption and bad governance in the 
context of the crisis in Greece.  
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after the introduction of the Euro in a country-pair model. They use several OECD indicators 
for structural reforms and show that labour- product- and financial market rigidities have an 
effect on the direction of bilateral trade. By doing so, Berger and Nitsch (2010) provide 
empirical support for a model, theoretically derived in Blanchard (2007).   
In this respect, a related strand of the literature that relates persistency in current account 
behaviour to structural factors may also be of importance. Zmanek et al. (2010) for instance, 
analyse the role of private restructuring and public structural reforms for readjustment of intra-
euro area imbalances. They use structural unemployment as well as social benefits as proxies 
for structural reforms. Another paper, Biroli, Mouree, and Turrini (2010) emphasizes that 
regulation affecting price and nominal wage flexibility as well as employment protection, 
influence the adjustment of real exchange rates in the Eurozone.  
In addition, some papers explore the relationship of the current account dispersion and the 
monetary union10. Givazzi and Spaventa (2010) amongst others, describe aberrations including 
potential moral hazard for governments associated with participation in the monetary union. 
More notably, Lane (2013) proposes reforms to improve the macroeconomic stability across 
the euro area based on observations of gross and net flows before the crisis. For Ireland, Lane 
(2014) presents an explanation for the built-up of the crisis, based on financial debt inflows 
related to its open financial policies and its attractiveness for FDI due to its tax legislation. 
Finally, some papers look at the development of institutions and their effect on economic 
outcomes. In an early paper, Hayek (1960) argues that institutions have to evolve organically 
and cannot be designed. The more recent literature, amongst others Berkowitz et al. (2003) and 
Roderik (2007), though claims that country specific circumstances determine whether 
institutions can be seen as appropriate. Related to structural reforms approaches, which are part 
of crisis adjustment programs in the Euro area, the findings of Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) 
are noteworthy. They point out that as long as the socio-economic power structure and the old 
institutions prevail, changes imposed from outside are most likely not successful.  
 
                                                 
10 The literature on current account imbalances in the Eurozone has come up with certain explanations for the 
evolution and persistence of the deficits. Evidence for increased bilateral intra-EU bond holdings and increased 
financial integration is presented in Lane (2006) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2007). Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2002), Blanchard (2007) and Ahearn et al. (2009) describe the so called convergence mechanism as 
key driver. Furthermore Lane and Pels (2012) highlight the importance of growth expectations for the evolution 
of current accounts in the Eurozone.    
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In the remainder, this paper adds to the literature on current accounts and external imbalances 
in the following dimensions. First, it focusses exclusively on a sample of European countries 
of which most have adopted a common currency. In addition institutional heterogeneity is 
discussed in more detail, and a link to the current account imbalances in the EU is established. 
Furthermore, the situation in Greece is given special attention, because it provides a natural 
experiment that overshadows European monetary integration. Finally, we examine a wide 
variety of empirical settings to present the importance of the institutional dimension for the 
development of current accounts across the European Union and especially within the 
Eurozone. 
4. Data and Pro-estimation Procedures 
Initially, we are interested in the relationship between institutional quality across the EU and 
the current account. To that end, the main model is given by:  
(1)                             𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  
where CAit is the dependent variable and represents the current account expressed as ratio to 
GDP of country i at time t. Institutionsit is a vector that contains two customized proxies for 
institutional quality of country i at time t. Furthermore, Xit is a vector of further explanatory 
variables. Finally, α is a constant and uit is the error term that captures unobservable effects.  
Several specifications of the model are estimated using four different estimation techniques. 
Depending on the econometric specification, country as well as time fixed effects are added. 
The specific composition of the error term thus depends on the type of estimator. A more 
detailed discussion of the differences, similarities and strengths of the estimators follows in the 
econometrics section.    
At the core of the dataset are current account data in levels as well as the two indices as proxies 
for institutional quality. More precisely, the Fraser Economic Freedom of the World Index and 
the ICRG Index. The former is published by the Fraser institute on a yearly basis. Before 2000 
data is available only for years that end either with 0 or 5. The EFW contains five different 
areas. These are, size of government, legal system including property rights, sound money, 
freedom to trade internationally and regulation. Somehow similar in its components, but more 
detailed the ICRG index is based on the ICRG Researchers Dataset which is a subset of the 
larger International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset. It contains sub-indices for government 
stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, 
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corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic 
accountability as well as bureaucratic quality. 
Both indices are altered to better serve the purpose of this study. In a first step internal conflict, 
external conflict, military in politics and religion in politics are excluded from the ICRG Index, 
due to irrelevance for advanced countries.  In a second step both indices were recalculated 
relative to an unweighted average of the top 3 countries in the Euro area. We decide to use the 
top 3 countries Germany, Austria and the Netherlands instead of only Germany as a baseline 
since the German series suffer from a unification bias in the early 1990s11. All three countries 
share a similar economic structure which is manifested by comparable country performances. 
Additionally, all three are very open to trade. Moreover Germany is the largest economy with 
respect to GDP in both the EU and the Eurozone.  
In line, with previous literature on European current accounts, the analysis focuses on a set of 
solely European countries. The dataset consists of the former EU15 countries as well as the 
countries of the Eastern Enlargement process plus Norway and Switzerland covering the period 
from 1990 to 2013. Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus are excluded. The reason for their exclusion 
is their small geographical area, their population size, their oversized financial sector or the low 
value of total GDP. The resulting dataset is thus homogeneous in its composition. One 
advantage of this selection is the shared adoption of the EU’s common framework or its close 
association to it (Berger and Nitsch, 2010). Furthermore potential outliers due not affect the 
results.  
The main sources of data are the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database for current account 
data as well as the European Commission’s AMECO database for key macroeconomic 
variables. Institutional data are taken from the Fraser Institute as well as from the ICRG Group’s 
Researcher Dataset. In addition, the dataset is augmented with data from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators and from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s(2007) External Wealth of 
Nations dataset. A complete list of countries as well as a variable list which explains the 
construction of the explanatory variables is given in the in the appendix. The list does also 
report the data sources for each variable. 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the main variables as well as additional control 
variables. As expected, the altered Fraser and ICRG indices show a high level of correlation 
 
                                                 
11 The index values for the unified Germany are lower than for West Germany in 1990.  
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with the current account, with the correlation being stronger for the latter. Furthermore the 
negative correlation between the outputgap and the current account follows basic economic 
theory. As demonstrated in Blanchard and Giavazzi(2002) the correlation between the output 
per worker and current accounts is quite substantial. This indicates that high levels of GDP per 
capita from which the aforementioned variable is constructed and current account surpluses go 
hand in hand.  
Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
 
Government debt on the other hand is weakly correlated with the current account but the sign 
is puzzeling. One possible explanation for this puzzle is the overall high level of government 
debt in the sample. Furthermore, countries such as Italy and France which managed to run 
balanced current accounts during the whole sample period despite above average levels of 
Government debt can finance their debt domestically. This however, is no option for countries 
with less developed financial systems.12 In addition countries such as the Baltic States or Spain 
pursued macroprudential policies that reduced their sovereign debt pre-2008, despite substantial 
current account deficits. 
Summary statistics are presented in the Appendix. All variables show a high variation across 
time as well as across countries, which makes the dataset suited for panel analysis. The mean 
current account is marginally negative but close to zero. This indicates a balanced current 
 
                                                 
12 In the Baltic States foreign banks dominate the financial sector and control more than 80% of the market 
according to the IMF. Major financial players in the Baltics are the Swedish banks Nordea and Swedbank.  
 CA Fraser ICRG gap Private 
credit 
Output 
per 
worker 
Government 
debt 
NFA/GDPt-1 
CA 1.000        
Fraser 0.389 1.000       
ICRG 0.519 0.5792 1.000      
Outputgap -0.274 -0.115 0.160 1.000     
Private credit 0.242 0.561 0.521 0.013 1.000    
Output per 
worker  
0.739 0.621 0.719 -0.039 0.576 1.000   
Government 
debt 
0.121 -0.033 -0.106 -0.245 0.078 0.200 1.000 
 
 
NFA/GDPt-1 0.631 0.335 0.285 -0.040 0.155 0.629 -0.138 1.0000 
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account for the whole sample. Surplus and deficit countries generally equalized the overall 
current account of the Euro Area. The standard deviation is almost six percent. Extreme ratios 
for the current accounts are present for both the minimum and the maximum. The maximum 
with more than 16 percent is Norway, which run current account surpluses above 10 percent 
for several years. One reason is its role as an oil exporter and the returns from its high net 
foreign asset surplus. The minimum value of nearly minus 21 percent or more than 3.5 standard 
deviations represents the Latvian current account deficit in 2006.   
Especially noteworthy are the time series as well as the cross-sectional dimension. Typically, 
panel data estimators are designed for “micro panel datasets”, e.g. small time and large cross-
sectional dimensions. With more than 20 years but only 24 cross-sectional units, the dataset in 
this paper epitomizes a typical “macro panel dataset” (Roodman, 2009). Therefore, potential 
problems arising from non-stationarity need to be addressed.  
In addition, the heterogeneity across the cross-sectional unit poses another problem; potential 
cross-sectional dependence. In two error component models, uit is formed by a combination of 
a fixed component specific to the country and a random component that captures pure noise. 
This means that they rely on the premise, that the cross-sectional units in the underlying panel 
are independent. Considering the high level of integration across the EU15, and more so, the 
Euro area, this assumption seems highly unlikely.  
In order to deal with both problems, all variables are tested using three testing procedures suited 
for panel unitroot tests. The Im, Pesaran and Shin(2003) test, and the Fisher-type unit root test, 
based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Both tests reject non-stationarity at the 1% level 
based on the p-values (0.0000) for all explanatory variables after taking first-differences13. 
Since the dependent variable is bound between 1 and -1 it is assumed to be stationary by 
construction. The Fisher-type test backs this reasoning. Based on the Im, Pesaran and Shin test, 
the HO that all panels contain unit roots (p-value 0.1211) however cannot be rejected. By 
subtracting cross-sectional means, the same test also rejects the HO that all panels contain unit 
roots (p-value 0.0239). This indicates that cross-sectional dependence is present. To further 
explore this issue, the average correlation coefficients and Pesaran’s cross-sectional 
dependence test proposed in Pesaran (2004) is conducted. For the current account as well as for 
 
                                                 
13 The full results of the Fisher-type test, the IPS test and the test results for Pesaran's simple panel unit root test 
in presence of cross section dependence and the Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test are available upon 
request.  
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the two indices, the test rejects the H0 of no cross-sectional dependence at the 1% level (p-value 
0.000). In order to further investigate this issue, Pesaran's CADF test, proposed in Pesaran 
(2003), is employed. Based on the p-value (0.022) we can reject the H0 that all series are non-
stationary. To conclude the results of these proestimation procedures, one can most 
conservatively say that non-stationarity cannot be ruled out completely. Nevertheless, this 
problem is well known in the non-stationary panel literature (Eberhardt and Teal, 2010).   
5. Institutional Quality and the Current Account  
Current Account imbalances across the European Union and especially arcross the Euro area 
have become substantial since the mid-1990s. The dynamics of the imbalances however are 
starker after 2000 (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). Figure 4 graphs the development of the 
current account dispersion in our sample over time. While the dispersion among the EU15 and 
the Euro area is almost equal until 2007, it becomes more pronounced between 2007 and 2009 
due to the high Swedish current account surplus. Excluding Greece and Portugal, the difference 
between the Eurozone minus the two and the EU15 is in almost one standard deviation. After 
2008, the gap widens to about 1.5 standard deviations.    
 
Figure 4 Current Account Dispersion  
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Finally, Figure 5 plots the average current account balance against the average Index values for 
the whole sample period and shows the yearly correlation coefficient. 
 
Figure 5 Institutional Quality and the Current Account (Y-axis in figure a. & c. is current account as 
percentage of GDP) 
The upper left graph a. plots the average current account for each country for the whole sample 
period plotted against the country average for the altered ICRG Index. The scatterplot displays 
a positive linear relationship. In the upper right graph, the yearly correlation between the current 
account and the altered ICRG index is presented. The correlation is substantial with coefficients 
between 0.6 and 0.8 for the period 2000 to 2008. This supports the postulated relationship 
between both variables. Moreover, the correlation is lowest in the advent of the Euro, due to 
countries efforts to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. Lastly, graph c. shows the same relationship 
as graph a. for the altered Fraser Index.   
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6. Empirical Specification and Results  
Before the results of the regression analysis are being discussed, several methodological issues 
need to be addressed. More specifically those issues are non-stationarity and potential serial 
correlation, cross-sectional dependence as well as heterogeneous slopes. Thereafter various 
estimations with different sets of explanatory variables are performed. In total five estimators 
are compared. 
First, a two way error component model, with country as well as time specific effects. Due to 
the existence of country inherent characteristics for instance firm structure not covered by the 
set of variables, a fixed effect model is a good choice to capture such effects. One key 
assumption of the fixed effects model due to its OLS properties is, that it requires exogenous 
regressors. By construction it allows for an analysis of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable by removing the time-invariant “country-specific” characteristics (Verbeek, 
2012). However, Verbeek (2012) argues, that OLS is an inefficient method, since the 
assumption that error term is independently and identically distributed (iid) is too strong and 
often violated in panel-data settings. All subsequent FE regressions are estimated using robust 
standard errors to correct for autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity in the error term. 
Second, a dynamic panel model is considered. Current accounts typically show a high degree 
of persistency over time. To test for this the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data 
is computed14. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation is clearly rejected at the 1% level (p-
value = 0.0000), indicating that a high degree of autocorrelation is present. As emphasized by 
Alvarez and Arellano (2003), fixed effect models can also be used with a lagged dependent 
variable.However, for dynamic panel data estimations, Arellano-Bond or Blundell-Bond GMM 
estimators are more commonly used (Roodman, 2009)15. The baseline model in (1) takes the 
following form with the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable:   
(2)     𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐴 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
In the case of the Arellano-Bond estimator, overfitting is apparent for this panel dataset with 24 
countries and more than 20 years of observations. This occurs, since the number of instruments 
 
                                                 
14 See Drucker(2003) for an application of the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data 
15 Roodman(2007, 2009) and Alvarez and Arellano(2003) provide a detailed description on dynamic-panel 
estimations.  
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is increasing quadratically in T for a standard GMM setting (Roodman, 2007). Thus, as a result 
the Arellano-Bond estimator converges to an OLS estimator (Alvarez and Arellano, 2003). 
The third estimator is the Generalized Least Square (GLS) estimator. This estimator already 
captures fixed effects to some extent; using additional fixed effects would only capture the 
unobserved characteristics (Phillips et al., 2013). The main advantage of the GLS estimator for 
panel data compared to the OLS FE estimator is that assumptions about the structure of the 
distribution of the error term can be made. For example, in terms of variances, correlations 
(cross-sectional) or autocorrelations (time series). All GLS estimations in this paper are run 
using panel wide AR (1) correction and allow for correlations across cross-sections. The 
downside of this estimator is that it requires a balanced panel.  
Fourth, the Mean Group and the Augmented Mean Group estimator, belong to the panel-time 
series literature. Both are primarily designed for the application in cases where the nature of the 
data set is more “macro” than “micro”. The Pesaran and Smith (1995) mean group (MG) as 
well as the AMG estimator, developed by Eberhardt and Teal (2010), allow for heterogeneous 
slope coefficients across group members. In addition, the AMG estimator allows for 
unobserved correlation across panel members as well16. 
In contrast to the previous model specified in (1), all mean group regression in this paper are 
based on a simple model of the following form, similar to the one in Eberhardt(2012). 
(3)                    𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑖 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(4)                      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒    𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 𝑓𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(5)                       𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼2𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 𝑓𝑡  + 𝛾𝑖 𝑔𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 
where xit and CAit are according to observables, the country- specific slope on the observable 
regressors is given by β1i. Moreover, uit contains the unobservables and the error terms eit 
(Eberhardt, 2012). According to Eberhardt (2012) the unobservables in (4) are made up of α1i, 
the standard group-specific fixed effects. They capture time-invariant heterogeneity across 
groups. The unobserved common factor ft with heterogeneous factor loadings θi, which can 
capture time-variant heterogeneity and cross-section dependence belongs as well to uit. 
 
                                                 
16 Applications of panel time-series estimators can be found amongst other in Eberhardt and Teal (2010, 2011), 
Hernández (2015) and Moscone and Tosetti(2010). 
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Furthermore, the factors ft and gt can be nonlinear and nonstationary. Last, εit and eit are assumed 
white noise (Eberhardt, 2012).  
Table 4 shows the most parsimonious specification of the model specified in (1) for a balanced 
sample of the former EU15 countries. column (1) introduces the FE estimator in its non-
dynamic form, whereas column (3) depicts the dynamic version, with a lagged dependent 
variable. The results of the GLS estimator are shown in column (2). The second dynamic model, 
based on the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is presented in column (4). The last two columns 
report the results of the Mean Group estimators. The Fraser and ICRG indices as independent 
variables are included in first-differences.  
Table 4 EU15 countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE GLS FE dyn. xtabond MG AMG 
Dep.var CA CA CA CA CA CA adj. 
       
CAt-1   0.850*** 0.815***   
   (0.016) (0.047)   
∆ Fraser 0.297** 0.080*** 0.078 0.104 0.292* 0.197 
 (0.103) (0.023) (0.063) (0.067) (0.174) (0.144) 
∆ ICRG 0.184*** 0.009 0.0093 -0.004 0.118** 0.088* 
 (0.058) (0.010) (0.027) (0.025) (0.059) (0.052) 
Constant 0.015 -0.002 0.012* 0.012** 0.005 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
       
Observations 308 308 308 294 308 308 
Country FE yes  yes    
Time FE yes  yes yes   
RMSE     0.0243 0.0239 
R2 0.157  0.769    
Number of 
countries 
14 14 14 14 14 14 
Note:  (robust) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, the common dynamic process 
of the AMG estimations has been subtracted from the dependent variable. All coefficient averages were 
computed as outlier-robust means.  
 
Except for the dynamic specifications, the coefficients of the two institutional measures point 
into the right direction and are significant. This supports the association of a positive 
relationship between institutional quality and the current account. The sign of the coefficient 
for ICRG in colum (4) points into the wrong direction. Albeit its magnitude is small and the 
effect is not significant. Additionally, the Root Mean Square Errors in column (5) and (6) are 
small indicating a good fit of the model. Based on the regression in column (1) two last tests 
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are performed. Pesaran’s CD test, which is a parametric testing procedure proposed by Pesaran 
(2004) that can be applied on balanced as well as unbalanced panels. Furthermore, in the context 
of large T and small N, the Lagrange multiplier test statistic proposed by Breusch and Pagan 
(1980) is used. Both tests lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no cross sectional 
dependence (p-value 0.0011 and 0.0000 respectively)17.   
In a next step, Table 5 displays similar regressions for a smaller sample that includes only 
countries which adopted the Euro in 1999 plus Greece. Again Fraser and ICRG are taken in 
first-differences.  
Table 5  Euro area 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE GLS FE dyn. xtabond MG AMG 
Dep.var CA CA CA CA CA CA adj. 
       
CAt-1   0.856*** 0.830***   
   (0.0187) (0.0454)   
∆ Fraser 0.318** 0.0953*** 0.0848 0.111 0.468** 0.315** 
 (0.113) (0.0279) (0.0656) (0.0676) (0.195) (0.153) 
∆ ICRG 0.200*** -0.00237 0.00629 -0.00600 0.182** 0.137*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0116) (0.0287) (0.0242) (0.0776) (0.0495) 
Constant 0.0103 -0.00272 0.0161* 0.0158*** -0.000398 0.0117 
 (0.0106) (0.00394) (0.00736) (0.00521) (0.0137) (0.0136) 
       
Observations 242 242 242 231 242 242 
Country FE yes  yes    
Time FE yes  yes yes   
RMSE     0.0251 0.0246 
R2 0.157  0.769    
Number of 
countries 
11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note:  (robust) Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, the common dynamic process 
of the AMG estimations has been subtracted from the dependent variable. All coefficient averages were 
computed as outlier-robust means.  
 
Again, the two proxies for institutional quality are significant in three of the non-dynamic 
estimations. Surprisingly, the sign of the ICRG index changes and becomes negative, yet the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Most notably, is the fact, that in all four non-
dynamic estimations the relationship between the current account, indicated by higher 
coefficient values, and the variables of interest is not only starker, but also highly significant 
 
                                                 
17 The correlation matrices for both tests are available upon request.  
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on the 1% or 5% level. To a first order, these finding confirms the hypothesis that institutional 
quality has an effect on the current account.    
The next set of regressions focuses on the whole sample (Table 6). Comparing the estimations 
with the results of the previous tables, the size of the coefficients indicate a still but less 
significant, but weaker relationship for the whole sample of 24 countries. Due to the unbalanced 
sample, the GLS estimator however cannot be computed. Noteworthy, is the sign for the ICRG 
index in column (3) which changes sign and is now positive as well. Table 7 overall shows, that 
the results from the previous subsamples extend to the whole sample.  
Table 6  whole sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FE FE dyn. xtabond MG AMG 
Dep.var CA CA CA CA CA adj. 
      
CAt-1  0.687*** 0.604***   
  (0.0416) (0.0560)   
∆ Fraser 0.140** 0.0770 0.0585 0.0453 0.0717 
 (0.0574) (0.0530) (0.0473) (0.0640) (0.0715) 
∆ ICRG 0.147*** 0.0316 0.00719 0.0851** 0.0768** 
 (0.0427) (0.0285) (0.0298) (0.0356) (0.0317) 
Constant -0.00957 0.00198 0.000606 -0.00981 -0.0213* 
 (0.00836) (0.00328) (0.00479) (0.0111) (0.0112) 
      
Observations 483 482 458 483 483 
Country FE yes yes    
Time FE yes yes yes   
RMSE    0.0312 0.0297 
R-squared 0.118 0.552    
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, the common dynamic process of the 
AMG estimations has been subtracted from the dependent variable. All coefficient averages were 
computed as outlier-robust means.  
 
To reinforce the findings of the previous regression sets, another battery of regressions is run.  
This time additional explanatory variables are added to the set up. Table 7 reports estimates for 
the augmented version of the baseline model. All explanatory variables except the two dummy 
variables are taken in first-differences. Since the GLS is the only estimator that can account for 
autocorrelation and correlations across panels, the sensitivity analysis is performed only with 
the GLS estimator. In addition this selection is in line with previous research. Papers such as 
Philipps et al. (2013), Ahearne et al. (2009) and Eichengreen(2010) evaluated determinants of 
the current account based on GLS regressions.  
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Table 7 Sensitivity Analysis based on the GLS estimator with AR (1) correction  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Columns (1) – (5) tabulate regression results for the baseline specification and the control 
variables output per worker, (demeaned) private credit, terms of trade in first differences, the 
outputgap  and two dummies, financial centre and Euro. Column (1) and (2) test differ in the 
length of the time dimension. Whereas Column (1), (4) and (6) are restricted by 4 years, the 
remaining columns contain regression results for the whole sample period through 2013. All 
additional regressors are significant in most specifications and their coefficient point into the 
direction one would assume from economic theory, except for the outputgap. Due to the lack 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
t -2009 -2013 -2013 -2009 -2013 -2009 -2013 
 Euro Euro Euro 
minus 
EU15 EU15 EU15 EU14 
Dep.var CA CA CA CA CA CA CA 
        
∆ Fraser 0.064*** 0.080*** 0.050 0.050*** 0.073*** 0.589** 1.106*** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.0307) (0.014) (0.022) (0.238) (0.400) 
∆ Fraser2      -0.280** -0.533*** 
      (0.125) (0.207) 
∆ ICRG -0.006 0.002 -0.013 -0.001 0.014 0.239*** 0.148 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.054) (0.106) 
∆ ICRG2      -0.126*** -0.071 
      (0.028) (0.056) 
outputgap -0.279*** -0.143*** -0.076 -0.183*** -0.106*** -0.195*** -0.097** 
 (0.057) (0.054) (0.061) (0.024) (0.039) (0.024) (0.040) 
∆ output 0.062*** 0.062** 0.016 0.025*** 0.042** 0.030*** 0.041** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.030) (0.00902) (0.020) (0.009) (0.020) 
∆ Credit -0.013 -0.039*** -0.049*** -0.005** -0.009*** -0.006** -0.009*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
∆ ToT 0.151*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.143*** 0.078*** 0.148*** 0.074*** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.029) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) 
Fin. centre 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Euro    -0.016** -0.014** -0.017*** -0.0149** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
        
Constant -0.008*** -0.009*** 0.002 0.009** 0.006 0.010** 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
        
Observations 198 242 198 252 308 252 308 
Number of 
countries 
11 11 9 14 14 14 14 
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of available data, the outputgap was constructed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter on yearly data. 
Therefore the magnitude of the coefficients should be taken with a “grain of salt”.  
The result for the main variables of interest is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
coefficient for the Fraser index supports the findings from the previous exercises. On the other 
hand, the results for the ICRG index are small, display the wrong direction in several columns 
and are statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. The results in column (3) however 
stand out. Excluding Greece and Portugal from the Euro sample, results in a breakdown of the 
relationship. Not only for institutional quality, as measured by the indices, but also for the 
variable output per worker.  This supports the argument, that weak institutions can explain 
current account deficits. On the other hand the remaining “high-quality” sample is more 
bedeviled by private credit which is negatively related to the current account and highly 
significant in almost all columns. Furthermore, a positive change in the terms of trade has a 
positive effect on the current account. Additionally, country which are small financial centres 
tend to have higher current accounts.  
Another noteworthy result is found in the columns (4)-(7). The dummy Euro has a highly 
significant (at the 5% or 1% level) and negative coefficient. This implies, that among EU15 
countries, those that adopted the Euro have lower current account balances. More generally, it 
highlights, that the Euro had an effect on current account development across the EU.       
The last two columns are different from the rest, since they add squared coefficients (in first 
differences) to the setting. Including these squared coefficients results in highly significant 
results both for the Fraser as well as the ICRG Index. The negative coefficients for both squared 
explanatory variables, could indicate a threshold. Improving institutional quality could have a 
positive effect on the current account, but only until a certain level is reached.  
Nonetheless, the results are ambiguous and indicate potential misspecification. Including 
squared independent variables, dramatically increases the size of the coefficients of the non-
squared institutional measures. Possible explanations for inconclusive estimation results on the 
effect of institutional quality on current account behaviour in the presence of squared 
independent variables are potential nonlinearities. Sizeable improvements in the indices may 
reflect lower imbalances, but lower Index volatility does not necessarily imply a further 
reduction in current account imbalances after a certain threshold. 
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As a last exercise the dependent variable is changed. Variants of equation (1) are estimated with 
the Intra-Euro, the External-EU and the total trade balance as ratio to GDP as dependent 
variables. In columns (1) to (6) of the table, estimates for the full sample period are presented. 
Table 8 Trade Balances and Institutional Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Euro EU15 Euro EU15 Euro EU15 
Dep.var Intra-EU TB Intra-EU TB External 
TB 
External 
TB 
TB TB 
       
∆ Fraser 0.041*** 0.038*** -0.002 -0.009 0.038** 0.024 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.016) 
∆ ICRG 0.009* 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.010 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant 0.012* 0.005* 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) 
       
Observations 242 308 242 308 242 308 
Number of 
countries 
11 14 11 14 11 14 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Replacing the current account, with the Trade Balances, yields similar results. For the Overall 
trade balance there seems to be a link to institutional quality. The same hold, for the Intra-EU 
trade balance. In columns (1) and (2) both independent variables are significant, mostly at the 
1% level. Yet, the size of the coefficients is smaller than for the current account.  
Finally, having obtained the econometric results two limitations must be addressed. First, 
dynamic panel estimations have proved to be difficult. Several different specifications were 
tested and depending on the selection of independent variables, significant results for the 
Arellano bond as well as the dynamic fixed effects estimator have also been obtained. However, 
these results are not reported in this section. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
does not only render the overall setting of the model, more severely it opens up a normative 
problem. If current accounts are mostly determined by previous years current accounts, 
additional factors become insignificant or extremely sensitive to changes in the variable 
selection This section therefore relies on GLS estimation with cross-sectional correlation and 
common AR(1) coefficients for all panels. Robustness tests are additionally performed using 
Mean group estimators that account for heterogeneous slopes.   
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7. Conclusion 
This paper provides consistent evidence, that institutional quality is a key aspect to explain the 
dispersion of the current account across the Euro area but also within the EU and the whole 
sample of 24 European countries. Whereas countries with better institutional quality tend to run 
current account surpluses, deficits are higher for countries with lower institutional quality. 
Moreover, we show that with the introduction of the euro the influence of institutional quality 
on the current accounts became stronger. In addition, excluding Greece and Portugal from the 
Euro sample breaks down the relationship. More than that, regression analysis suggests, that a 
potential threshold value for institutional quality exists. This indicates that above a certain level 
of institutional quality other aspects likely contribute to current account surpluses. Being a 
financial centre constitutes such a cause. Potential explanations are the domestic sectoral mix 
and firm structure or the disposability of natural resources. Albeit this question lies outside the 
scope of this paper and could be a promising direction for further research.  Furthermore, the 
relationship between the current account and institutional quality holds for the intra-EU and 
total trade balances, but not unambigously for the external trade balances. Yet, the relationship 
between trade balances and institutional quality is weaker than for the current account.    
In the econometric part several issues such as the misfit of traditional panel estimators for macro 
datasets, non-stationarity, cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneous slopes are addressed. 
Robustness tests of regressions based on different estimators are employed. Controlling for the 
aforementioned issues, the findings remain valid.  
The findings of this paper add to the policy debate in various dimensions. First, they support 
the inclusion of structural reforms in additional bailout programs. Second, the mistakes of the 
past are likely to be repeated, if the economic conditions brighten up and no improvements in 
institutional quality are made. Third, potential Euro area candidates should be scrutinized more 
precisely. Fourth, European Institutions such as the ECB and the European Commission should 
provide further expertise based on experiences from high quality institution countries to support 
countries with weaker institutions. By that, a second economic tragedy like the one Greece faces 
can most likely be avoided. This warning is targeted towards Romania which plans to join the 
Euro. Based on the results of this paper, its adoption seems prematurely.  
Finally, for Greece the findings imply that it should create a more business friendly 
environment. Among other improvements, this requires a faster and much better enforcement 
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of contracts as well as a legal system that is capable to settle disputes in a reasonable time and 
according to international standards. The fight against corruption and its proscription should 
also become a top priority. Taking such measures would strengthen the confidence and could 
increase the attractiveness of Greece as a business location. Without such changes and no 
improvements in institutional quality, Greece’s perspective in the Euro area however remains 
bleak. 
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Appendix A 
 
Country Appendix 
Countries in the dataset 
Austria Germany Poland 
Belgium Greece Portugal 
Czech Republic Hungary Spain 
Denmark Ireland Slovak Republic 
Belgium Italy Slovenia 
Estonia Latvia Sweden 
Finland Lithuania Switzerland 
France Netherlands United Kingdom 
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Appendix B Data Appendix 
Current Account: all data comes from the  IMF’s WEO database and is reported as ratio to 
GDP.   
External Trade Balance relative to GDP:  
All series taken from AMECO database. Defined as Exports of goods extra-EU (DXGE) – 
Imports of goods extra- EU (DMGE)/ Gross Domestic Product at current prices (UVGD)   
 
Internal Trade Balance relative to GDP:  
All series taken from AMECO database. Defined as Exports (DXGI) – Imports (DMGI) /GDP 
(UVGD) 
 
Total Trade relative to GDP:  
All series taken from AMECO database. External Trade Balance- Internal Trade Balance / 
Gross Domestic Product at current prices (UVGD) 
 
Demeaned private credit to capture credit growth above its previous historical trend level. 
(Source: World Development Indicators) 
 
Output per worker (GDP/working age population (15-65)) measured in Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPP) relative to an unweighted average of Austria, Germany and Austria, and finally 
demeaned to reflect departures from long run productivity. (own calculations, data taken from 
AMECO).    
 
Government debt as ratio to GDP. (Source: AMECO) 
 
The terms of trade, included to capture the effects of changes in world market prices for a 
country’s exports or imports  (AMECO) 
 
The lagged value of the net foreign asset position expressed as ratio to GDP (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2007 – External Wealth of Nations Database) 
 
A dummy variable for EURO which is one for all years, where a country joins or belongs to 
the eurozone.  
 
A dummy variable capturing whether a country is a major centre for international financial 
trade.  (Philipps et al. 2013) 
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Appendix C 
Summary Statistics  
 
 
